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ARGUMENT 
I lYlr. Horrocks could not develop his defense theories without the assistance of an 
accountant 
The State argues that it was not obligated to provide Mr. Horrocks with an 
accountant because the trial court determined that an accountant was not necessary. This 
begs the question. The issue was whether Mr. Horrocks was entitled to an accountant to 
make that very determination. It is possible that an accountant may have made such a 
determination, but it is equally possible that an accountant would have arrived at 
conclusions different from those of the trial judge. Before Mr. Horrocks could develop 
his defense theories, he needed a factual basis from the accounting. In essence, the trial 
court ruled that Mr. Horrocks could not obtain that factual basis unless he could first 
demonstrate that factual basis. Such a rule would effectively foreclose the State from ever 
having to provide an expert witness to indigent defendants. That is clearly not the intent 
of the statute. Mr. Horrocks should have been provided with an accountant, at the very 
least to make the threshold detennination as to the defenses available to him. As it was, at 
least one $3,000 mistake became apparent at trial. R. 436, p. 449. 
IL The State has failed to demonstrate how the evidence as to each charge was 
necessary as to the other charge. 
The pivotal issue with regard to joinder of the two charges was whether evidence 
as to the one would have been admissable as to the other. State v. Meade, 27 P.3d 1115, 
1130 (Utah 2001). The critical inquiry is whether the proffered evidence was a necessary 
element of the offense charged. State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 432, 437 (Utah 1989). The 
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question is not whether the offenses occurred at the same time, nor whether some of the 
witnesses would be the same, nor whether the charges were identical, nor even whether 
the State alleged the charges to have been part of a common scheme or plan. The question 
is whether "a common scheme or plan" was a necessary element of either of the offenses. 
It is not. Under U.C.A. §76-7-201(1), the only element of the offense relevant to the 
proffered evidence was whether the defendant acted "knowingly." 
The issue at trial was not whether the State had determined the correct amount to 
be paid each month, but whether Mr. Horrocks had paid it. The amount he may have 
owed to Ms. Warden had no bearing on whether he paid Ms. Pincock, and the amount he 
may have owed Ms. Pincock had no bearing on whether he paid Ms. Warden. Moreover, 
the State's observation that Mr. Horrocks made separate statements of intent to both ex-
wives demonstrates that proof of a common scheme or plan was not necessary to the 
State's case. Appellees Br. p. 19. In other words, Mr. Horrocks' statement to Teresa 
"that she would never see the money" would not have been admissable at a separate trial 
to demonstrate an intent not to pay Maria, and his statement to Maria "that he spends a 
hell of a lot of money making sure she doesn't know how much money he has" would not 
have been necessary or admissable to demonstrate his intent regarding Teresa. Id. 
At separate trials, the State would have had no need to show the amount owed to 
one ex-wife in order to demonstrate either the obligation to the other or an intent not to 
pay. One could just as easily argue that several defendants should be tried together on 
drug charges because the same expert witness would be testifying in each case. The issue 
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is not the convenience of the State, but whether the same evidence would be introduced 
in each case. Since there were clearly elements as to each separate offense lliai would not 
have been admissable in a separate trial of the other, joinder of the two trials could not 
help but prejudice Mr. Horrocks. Indeed, given the separate accounts and separate 
statements of intent to separate victims, it would seen i t.t lat the inly pi it pose of aliegmg "a 
common scheme or plan," when such a scheme or plan is not a necessary element of the 
offense, was to intentionally create such prejudice. 
rocks was prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge. 
The point in a plain error analysis is that prejudice should be apparent from the 
record. This becomes apparent in numerous instances. Prior to trial, the court made it 
clear that it was going to exclude Mr. Horrocks' exhibits before the court had received 
the argument of Mr. Horrocks' defense counsel. R. 425, p. 6. The court then suggested 
that defense counsel put on evidence that could only be properly presented by the very 
accountant the court had refused to provide, pp. 11-12. The court berated defense counsel 
for not having matters ready for trial which in fact the court had denied in motions prior 
to trial, pp. 34-37. 
At trial the court specifically defined the elements of leading questions, then 
permitted leading questions by the prosecution pp. 182 183, 213. Overall, the court 
routinely overruled defense objections but sustained prosecution objections, apparently 
without regard to merit. 219, 262-263, R. 426, pp. 389 and 453. It appears that a 
predisposition in favor of the prosecution tainted all of the proceedings and effectively 
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prevented Mr. Horrocks from obtaining the defense resources he needed, as well as from 
presenting his full theory of defense in a non-cumulative forum. 
CONCLUSION 
Without an accountant, Mr. Horrocks was denied the opportunity to adequately 
defend himself. He was also prejudiced by having both counts tried together, and by bias 
on the part of the trial judge. His convictions should therefore be reversed. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2007. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Appellant 
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